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1
In the past few years, currency and ¿nancial crises originating in one country or group of
countrieshaveoften spread internationally. In periodsof instability, asset pricemovementsand
comovements across markets and across borders have increased visibly compared with more
tranquil periods. The size of these comovements during crises have led many economists to
raise the question of whether ‘tranquil periods’ and ‘crises’ are to be interpreted as different
regimes in the international transmission of ¿nancial shocks￿ that is, of whether there are
discontinuities in the international transmission mechanism.
2
The headline of the theoretical and policy debate on this issue is usually ‘contagion’.
3
Contagion –as opposed to ‘interdependence’–conveystheideathat international transmission
mechanism is discontinuous, as a result of ¿nancial panics, herding, or switches of
expectations across instantaneous equilibria. Although there is considerable ambiguity about
what exactly contagion is and how we should measure it, several authors have proposed
empirical tests in an attempt to address the issue of contagion versus interdependence on
empirical grounds (see Forbes and Rigobon, 1999a and 1999b, Boyer et al,. 1999, among
others).
The idea underlying these studies is to compare cross-market correlation in tranquil and
crisis periods and de¿ne FRQWDJLRQ DV VWUXFWXUDO EUHDNV LQ WKH SDUDPHWHUV RI WKH XQGHUO\LQJ
GDWD JHQHUDWLQJ SURFHVV. Supposethat acrisis is caused by shocks to some global factors in the
worldeconomy. For a given mechanism of international transmission, changes in the volatility
of asset prices in one market can be expected to be correlated with changes in volatility in
4 We thank Luca Dedola and seminar participants at the ZEI Summer School and Banca d’Italia for com-
ments. Giovanna Poggi has provided valuable research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ect the position of the Bank of Italy, or any other institutions with
which the authors are af¿liated. E-mail: corsetti@yale.edu￿ pericoli.marcello@insedia.interbusiness.it￿ sbra-
cia.massimo@insedia.interbusiness.it.
5 The possibility of such discontinuities is a concern for both investors and policy makers. If correlation
across assets is abnormally high during ¿nancial crises, diversi¿cation of international portfolios may fail to
deliver exactly when its bene¿ts are needed the most. By the same token, excessive comovements of asset prices
may spread a country-speci¿c shock to other economies, even when these have better domestic fundamentals.
6 A partial list of contributions to this debate includes Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Bordo and Mushid (2000),
Buiter et al. (1998), Calvo (1999), Calvo and Mendoza (1999), Caramazza et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2000),
Edwards (1998), Eichengreen et al. (1998), Jeanne and Masson (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Kamin-
sky and Schmukler (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (1999), and Schinasi and Smith (1999).8
other markets. During a period of ¿nancial turmoil, some comovements across markets are
therefore an implication of interdependence. By contrast, contagion will occur when the
observed pattern of comovement in asset prices is too strong relative to what can be predicted
when holding the mechanism of international transmission constant.
Building on a simple factor model, this paper presents a critical assessment of the
empirical literature on correlation analysis of contagion. Key to this literature is the
speci¿cation of a theoretical measure of interdependence, suitable to capture the international
effects of an increase in the volatility of asset prices IRU D JLYHQ WUDQVPLVVLRQ PHFKDQLVP.W e
showthat manyleadingcontributionsderivesuchmeasureby(implicitly)makingaspeci¿cye t
arbitrary identi¿cation assumption about a key parameter: the ratio between the variance of the
country-speci¿c shock and the variance of the global factor weighted by its factor loading. We
refer to it as the ‘variance ratio’, and denote it by b. Tests that are conditional on a low value
of b tend to accept the null hypothesis of interdependence, while tests that are conditional
on a high value of b tend to reject the null of no contagion. Using the Hong Kong stock
market crisis in October 1997 as a representative case study, we provide some estimates of
b suggesting that, in a number of cases, the null hypothesis of interdependence would be
erroneously accepted when adopting those ‘adjusted’ or ‘corrected’ correlation tests proposed
by the literature, arbitrarily setting b ’f .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts about stock
market returns in the nineties, comparing their behavior during crisis and tranquil periods.
A notable point here is that ¿nancial crises are characterized by an increase in the variance
and covariance of returns across markets, but not necessarily by an increase in correlation.
Section 3 introduces a factor model and derives a general empirical test. Section 4 discusses
the existing literature in the light of our model. Section 5 conducts a test of ¿nancial contagion
from the 1997 Hong Kong stock market crisis. Section 6 concludes.
￿￿ 6W\OL]HG IDFWV
We start our analysis by presenting a set of stylized facts regarding the transmission
of shocks across stock markets.
4 We single out four stylized facts characterizing periods of
7 In a companion paper, we present empirical evidence for nominal exchange rates against the U.S. dollar,
overnight interest rates, and sovereign spreads of U.S. dollar denominated bonds with corresponding U.S. assets
(see Corsetti et al., 2000).9
international ¿nancial turmoil in our sample. The¿rst two are well understood and extensively
discussed by the literature. These are the concentration of sharp downward adjustments in
stockpricesandthesharpincreaseinaveragevolatilityofdailyreturns. Theothertwoareoften
and somewhat surprisingly confused in both formal and informal discussions of contagion:
crises are systematically associated with a sharp increase in the cross market FRYDULDQFH of
asset returns￿ yet the direction of the change in cross market FRUUHODWLRQ of asset returns is
not homogeneous across countries and crisis episodes — in several cases correlation actually
drops during a crisis relative to tranquil periods. This is more than a technical point, as it raises
the issue of assessing the relative importance of country-speci¿c factors, as opposed to global
factors, underlying the increase in market volatility during periods of turmoil.
Our data set includes 18 countries: the G7 countries, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. We
use daily and weekly data from January 1990 to March 2000￿ the source is 7KRPVRQ )LQDQFLDO
’DWDVWUHDP. For each stock market in our sample, we examine levels and volatility of returns,
calculated in local currency, as well as covariance and correlation patterns with other markets.
We allow for four periods of crisis in international ¿nancial markets: from September 1992
to August 1993 (hereafter (50 FULVLV), from October 1994 to June 1995 (hereafter 0H[LFDQ
FULVLV), from July 1997 to January 1998 (hereafter $VLDQ FULVLV), and from May 1998 to March
1999 (hereafter 5XVVLDQ￿%UD]LOLDQ FULVLV). However, the emphasis of the study is on stock
markets of emerging economies during the second half of the 1990s.
2.1 )RXU HPSLULFDO UHJXODULWLHV
￿￿￿ 6KDUS IDOOV LQ VWRFN SULFHV WHQG WR FRQFHQWUDWH LQ SHULRGV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
¿QDQFLDO WXUPRLO
Many authors have observed that ¿nancial crises are not randomly distributed. For
instance, Eichengreen et al. (1996) noted that clusters of speculative attacks on the exchange
rate of several countries are usually separated by long phases of tranquillity.
The stock market crises in our sample follow patterns that are consistent with this
observation. Whilereferring to IMF (1998 and 1999) for a comprehensiveanalysis of ¿nancial
markets in the second half of the nineties, here we note that most $VLDQ stock indices started
to decline almost simultaneously before the eruption of the crisis in 1997 and maintained a10
descending path until the end of 1998 (see Corsetti et al., 2000, and Corsetti, 1998). Stock
prices in Asia were not affected by the Mexican crisis, with the exception of Hong Kong. In
/DWLQ $PHULFD, stock markets partially survived the Asian crisis, but were all greatly affected
by the Mexican crisis and by the Russian/Brazilian crisis. The impact of the last episode was
especially strong, bringing about a drop of over 50 per cent in stock indices. At the end of
March 2000, stock prices of most emerging market economies had not recovered relative to
their historical level. In the *￿ FRXQWULHV, the impact of the Mexican and the Asian crises was
negligible, while the effect of the Russian/Brazilian crisis was much deeper. Yet stock markets
also recovered quickly after this crisis.
￿￿￿ 9RODWLOLW\ RI VWRFN SULFHV LQFUHDVHV GXULQJ FULVLV SHULRGV
Volatility of stock market returns is shown in ¿gures 1a and 1b. In $VLD, stock market
volatility increases everywhere in 1997-99 relative to 1990-96, with the sole exception of the
Philippines.
5 In 1997 and 1998 volatility records two peaks, corresponding to the Asian and
the Russian/Brazilian crises.
6 By contrast, Hong Kong is the sole country in the region that is
signi¿cantly affected by the Mexican crisis. Overall, average volatility in 1997-99 is almost
twice that in 1990-96. As regards /DWLQ $PHULFDQ countries, in the second half of the 1990s
stock market volatility either decreases relative to previous record-high levels, as in the case of
Argentina, or it remains constant, as in the cases of Brazil and Mexico. Volatility in these two
countries is subject to large swings in correspondence with the crisis episodes, yet it is around
its sample average by the end of the decade. In 5XVVLD, volatility increases in 1997, peaking
dramatically in the summer of 1998.
7
8 We compute‘instantaneous’ volatilityof returns for countryl attimewas an exponential-weightedmoving
average given by ￿l>w @
t
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and the instantaneous correlation coef¿cient is ￿lm>w @ ￿lm>w@+￿l>w￿m>w,. Volatility has also been estimated with
a simple GARCH(1,1) model, which yields essentially the same results and, hence, is not shown. Variables
computed using daily, weekly and monthly returns give very similar results.
9 Only in Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand did volatility reach higher levels in 1990 than in 1997-99.
: Volatility of sovereign spreads followed a similar pattern during the period. It strongly increased in 1997
and in 1998, then gradually decreased in 1999 (see Corsetti et al., 2000).11
In LQGXVWULDOL]HG FRXQWULHV, stock market volatility increases gradually from 1990 to
1999, with the exception of Japan, where it decreases, and France, where it shows no trend.
In most countries, volatility peaks in 1990-92, then decreases until 1997, when it rises again,
reaching historical highs in 1998.
￿￿￿ &RYDULDQFH EHWZHHQ VWRFN PDUNHW UHWXUQV LQFUHDVHV GXULQJ FULVLV SHULRGV
Covariance of weekly returns is presented in ¿gures 2a to 2d. Figure 2a con¿rms
that $VLDQ FRXQWULHV are relatively unaffected by the Mexican crisis. Although covariance
is never nil during this crisis (as in most tranquil periods), its level is often lower than
the peaks recorded before and after the crisis. By contrast, the impact of the Asian and
the Russian/Brazilian crises on cross-country comovements of stock returns is much higher.
Covariance between weekly returns of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Thailand reaches record highs during the Asian crisis, diminishes somewhat shortly after,
and reaches new peaks in 1998-99. It returns to pre-1997 levels only by the end of 1999.
Covariances between each of these ¿ve countries with Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and the
US follow a very similar pattern (Figures 2b and 2c).
In /DWLQ $PHULFD, covariances between returns of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
sharply increase during the three episodes of crisis in the second half of the 1990s (Figure
2d). Comovements of returns in Latin American countries with the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV are not
signi¿cantly different from tranquil periods during the Mexican crisis, but are quite strong
during the Asian and the Russian/Brazilian crises. Finally, covariances of Latin American
countries and the United States with 5XVVLD (for which data is available only from January
1996) recorded sizable increments during the Asian and the Russian/Brazilian crises.
￿￿￿ &RUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ VWRFN PDUNHW UHWXUQV LV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ ODUJHU GXULQJ FULVLV
SHULRGV WKDQ GXULQJ WUDQTXLO SHULRGV
Figures 3a to 3d show correlation coef¿cients of weekly returns for the stock markets
in the sample. For $VLDQ FRXQWULHV,a¿rst notable piece of evidence is that, during the Asian
crisis, correlation remains below or at the same level of the peaks recorded between 1995 and
1997. That is to say, correlation is not signi¿cantly larger during crisis periods than during
tranquil periods.12
A second notable piece of evidence is that correlation is on an increasing path, both
after the beginning of the Asian crisis, and after the Hong Kong crash in October 1997.
However, one cannot identify an analogous pattern during other episodes of crisis. For
instance, correlation across Asian stock markets during the Russian/Brazilian crisis, either
remains stable or decreases. By the same token, there is no single correlation pattern during
the ERM and Mexican crises.
In /DWLQ $PHULFD,correlation betweenthestock marketsofArgentina, Brazil andMexico
increases during the Mexican, Asian and Russian/Brazilian crises￿ during the same crisis
episodes, correlation of Latin American countries with the United States increases as well.
The magnitude of correlation between the 5XVVLDQ and the US stock markets has gradually
increased between 1994 and 2000.
As for LQGXVWULDO FRXQWULHV, correlation of US stock returns YLV￿j￿YLV France, United
Kingdom, Italy and Canada is rising from the low values recorded in 1993-95, reaching a peak
in 1999. Somewhat surprisingly, the correlation of both the United States and the European
countries with Germany decreases from 1990 until end-1998. No clear trend is observable in
the correlation between Japanese and US stock prices.
2.2 $ FDVH VWXG\
Figure 4 below presents a case study that summarizes well the typical patterns
emphasized in our analysis above. The ¿gure shows the pattern of volatility, covariance
and correlation for Hong Kong and the Philippines. In order to disentangle the largest price
movements, we also show an indicator of price reversal, calculated as the ratio between the
value of the stock market in period | and its maximum value up to period | E%|*6@%i%￿j|
￿’f￿
— called ￿￿￿j |.
While the Mexican crisis has a limited impact on most Asian countries, stock prices in
both Hong Kong and the Philippines record some decline and a rise in volatility. Cross-market
linkages between the two countries at ¿rst record a decrease in covariance and correlation, due
to the sharper movements in the Hong Kong prices. Then, both covariance and correlation
show an inverted V-shape.13
During the Asian and the Russian/Brazilian crises, the drop in prices as well as the
increase in volatility and covariance are quite striking. In particular, covariance between the
two markets rises fromnilto itsrecord high for thedecade, withasharp step uparoundOctober
1997, when the Hong Kong stock market crisis erupts. Covariance remains on high levels until
the ¿rst quarter 1998, then decreases somewhat, before rising again in correspondence with
the Russian turmoil. Correlation increases steadily during the Asian crisis although it does not
appear signi¿cantly larger than in 1996￿ it decreases somewhat between May and September
1998 and is fairly stable thereafter.
Figure 4
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Note: Shaded areas correspond to the crisis periods de¿ned in the text.14
Inlightof thestylizedfactsdiscussedabove, what strikesmarket participantsasevidence
of contagion is the magnitude of asset price movements occurring more or less simultaneously
in different regions of the world, as measured by the dramatic increase in covariance and
volatility. Correlation seldom rises above the level recorded in tranquil periods, even during
‘extreme’ episodes of international transmission of shocks.
￿￿ $ IDFWRU￿PRGHO DSSURDFK WR WKH DQDO\VLV RI FRQWDJLRQ
3.1 7KH PRGHO
This section lays out a simple factor model to approach the issue of testing for structural
breaks in the international transmission mechanism. For the purpose of comparison with the
currentliterature, we focus oncorrelation analysis, castingour argumentwithinthe framework
of a single factor model. A meaningful generalization of our argument to multi-factor models
is best accomplished without using correlation-based tests — a task that is left to future
contributions.
Assume that the rates of return of the stock markets in country ￿ and country ￿ are
generated by the process:
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s n 0￿ (1)
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s n 0￿ ,
where k￿ and k￿ are constant numbers, ￿￿ and ￿￿ are market-speci¿c factor loadings, s is
a global factor, 0￿ and 0￿ denote idiosyncratic risks, and where s, 0￿ and 0￿ are mutually
independent random variables with ¿nite and strictly positive variance.
8
For simplicity, let both ￿￿ and ￿￿ be strictly positive. From the process above, the
correlation coef¿cient between o￿ and o￿ can be written as:
9
4 ￿ ￿JooEo￿co ￿￿’
￿J￿Eo￿co ￿￿
s
T@ o Eo￿￿ ￿ T@ o Eo￿￿
; Allowing for some covariance across country-speci¿c terms does not substantially modify the main result
of our analysis on the need to adjust correlation coef¿cients for the variance of country-speci¿cs h o c k s .
< We denote with Yd ut h ev a r i a n c eo p e r a t o r ,Fry the covariance operator and Fruu the linear correlation
operator.15
’
￿
k
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￿T@ o Es￿
l￿*2
￿
k
￿n
T@ o E0￿￿
￿2
￿T@ o Es￿
l￿*2 .
For given factor loadings ￿￿ and ￿￿, a rise in correlation must correspond to shocks
increasing the variance of the global factor s relative to the variance of the idiosyncratic
noise 0￿ and/or 0￿. Given the variances of the global factor and the idiosyncratic components,
however, a rise in correlation could also correspond to an increase in the magnitude of the
factor loadings ￿￿ and ￿￿, or to an increase in the correlation between the idiosyncratic risks.
This distinction is at the root of recent empirical studies comparing contagion with
interdependence. Consider a ¿nancial crisis in country ￿. The increase in the variance of
the stock market return in such a country may be due to an increase in the variance of either
the global factor s or the country speci¿c component 0￿, or both. It is apparent that, if the
change in the variance of the global factor s is large enough relative to the change in the
variance of the country speci¿c component 0￿, cross-market correlation must increase during a
crisis in country￿. This change incorrelation is LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH, in the sense that, FRQGLWLRQDO
RQ WKH RFFXUUHQFH RI D ¿QDQFLDO FULVLV LQ FRXQWU\ ￿￿ LW LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH GDWD JHQHUDWLQJ
SURFHVV (1). &RQWDJLRQ, as opposed to interdependence, occurs if the increase in correlation
turns out to be ‘too strong’ relative to what is implied by the process (1)￿ i.e. it is too strong to
be explained by the behavior of the global factor and the country speci¿c component. In other
words, contagion occurs when, conditional on a crisis, correlation is stronger because of some
structural change in the international economy affecting the link across markets.
In a related de¿nition, contagion occurs when a country-speci¿c shock becomes
‘regional’ or ‘global’. This means that there is some factor # for which factor loadings are zero
in all countries but one during tranquil periods, and become positive during crisis periods. An
illustration of this concept of contagion is provided by the following two-factor model:
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s n q￿ ￿ # n 0￿
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s n
￿
# n #￿
￿
,
whereq￿ hasbeen normalizedto ￿. If interdependence, q￿ ’f , sothat theprocessisequivalent
to the data generating process (1) by setting 0￿ ’ # n #￿. Contagion occurs when the country
speci¿c shock # becomes a global factor, L￿H￿ when q￿ 9’f . As shown below, our measure16
of interdependence is derived under the null hypothesis q￿ ’f . Thus, it will be unaffected
by a change in the speci¿cation of the process for the rates of return, which uses the above
expressions instead of the process (1).
These de¿nitions provide a general framework for the empirical test discussed below.
3.2 &RQGLWLRQDO FRUUHODWLRQ DQDO\VLV
How can one derive a theoretical measure of correlation suitable for discriminating
between contagion and interdependence according to the model presented above? Suppose
that we can identify the ‘origin’ of an international ¿nancial crisis in some country ￿ (e.g.
Mexico at the end of 1994, Thailand in July 1997, Hong Kong in October 1997). Let B denote
the proportional change in the variance of the stock market return o￿ relative to the pre-crisis
period. Then, we can write:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿’E ￿nB￿T@ o Eo￿￿ ,
where ￿ denotes the event ‘crisis in country ￿’. Note that the observed change in the variance
of o￿ does not necessarily coincide with an increase in the variance of the global factor, as the
variance of the country-speci¿c component may also change during the crisis.
In order to test whether changes in the correlation between o￿ and o￿ during a crisis
in ￿ are consistent with the data generating process (1), we must specify a measure of
interdependence under the assumption that ￿￿, ￿￿, T@ o E0￿￿ and ￿J￿E0￿c0 ￿￿ GR QRW YDU\ with
the crisis in country ￿. Appendix I shows that, under such an assumption, the correlation
coef¿cient between o￿ and o￿ can be written as the following function ￿:
￿Eb￿cb
￿
￿ cBc4￿ ￿ 4
5
7
#
￿nb￿
￿nb
￿
￿
$2
￿nB
￿n42
k
E￿ n B￿
￿nb￿
￿nb￿
￿ ￿ ￿
l
E￿ n b￿￿
6
8
￿*2
, (2)
where b￿ (b
￿
￿ ) denotes the ratio between the variance of the idiosyncratic shock 0￿ and the
variance of the global factor s, scaled by the factor loading ￿￿, during the tranquil (crisis)
period:
b￿ ’
T@ o E0￿￿
￿2
￿ ￿ T@ oEs￿
and b
￿
￿ ’
T@ o E0￿ m ￿￿
￿2
￿ ￿ T@ o Es m ￿￿
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In what follows, we will referto ￿as atheoretical measureof interdependence. Thecorrelation
coef¿cient between o￿ and o￿ observed during the crisis, denoted by 4￿, and the theoretical
measure of interdependence ￿ are the main elements of our test.
The coef¿cient ￿ is derived under the null hypothesis of interdependence: if ￿￿, ￿￿
T@ o E0￿￿ and ￿J￿E0￿c0 ￿￿ do not change during the crisis, 4￿ and ￿ will coincide. Conversely,
if there is contagion in the form of an increase in the magnitude of factor loadings or a positive
correlation between idiosyncratic risks (e.g., because some country-speci¿c factor becomes
global during the crisis in country ￿), 4￿ will be larger than ￿. Then, under the identifying
assumption that contagion from international crises does not alter the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks in countries other than ￿ (i.e. T@ o E0￿￿ is constant), a statistical analysis of contagion
vs. interdependence can be performed by testing whether 4￿ is signi¿cantly higher than ￿.
We should stress an important featureof this approach to testing. During an international
crisis originating in one country, shocks to the global factor tend to induce large comovements
of prices. Yet, the country where the crisis originates may also be subject to large shocks
that are and remain country-speci¿c. Overall cross-market correlation may fall. The fact that
during a crisis correlation falls (as it often does in the data, see Section 2) is by no means
evidence against contagion. In other words, testing for contagion needs not be conditional on
observing a hike in correlation. In line with this remark, the test is symmetrical￿ namely, it can
also be applied to structural breaks and contagion consisting in looser interdependence (e.g.
falling factor loadings). There is no reason why the concept of contagion should be con¿ned
to the hypothesis of stronger than normal ties.
￿￿ $ UHYLHZ RI WKH OLWHUDWXUH
This section analyzes recent empirical contributions on contagion, identifying a set of
tests that can be interpreted as special cases of our framework. To introduce our discussion,
it is useful to simplify our test statistic ￿ by assuming that the variance ratio de¿n e di nt h e
previous section does not vary across periods, b
￿
￿ ’ b￿. Assuming a constant ratio means that
the variance of the global factor and the variance of the country-speci¿cr i s ki n c r e a s eb yt h e
same proportion during the crisis in ￿:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
’
T@ o Es m ￿￿
T@ o Es￿
’
T@ o E0￿ m ￿￿
T@ o E0￿￿
’￿nB .18
Then, the coef¿cient of interdependence ￿ simpli¿es to:
￿Eb￿cBc4￿’4
￿
￿nB
￿nB42E￿ n b￿￿
￿￿*2
. (3)
Other things equal, a larger variance-ratio b￿ reduces the effect of an increase in the variance
of o￿ on the coef¿cient of interdependence. This is because a larger fraction of this variance is
due to the country-speci¿c component, hence weakening cross-market linkages.
To clarify this point, we consider once again the case study analyzed at the end of
section 2, that is the spread of ¿nancial instability in the stock market from Hong Kong to the
Philippines in October 1997. Figure 5 below shows the ‘instantaneous’ correlation coef¿cient
between stock market returns in Hong Kong and the Philippines, both measured in US dollars,
during 1997. The daily correlation provides a proxy for 4 (during tranquil periods) and 4￿
(during crises). Note that, before October 20, which is the starting day of the crisis, we only
report the instantaneous correlation, 4|￿ from October 20 on, we report both the instantaneous
correlation, 4￿
| , and a set of coef¿cients of instantaneous correlation under the null hypothesis
of interdependence, calculated assuming different values of b￿.
For the purpose of the graph, we ¿nd it useful to calculate and plot an inverse
transformation of ￿, instead of ￿ itself. This transformation, denoted by ￿
￿
|Eb￿￿, is given below
￿
￿
|Eb￿￿’
4￿
| t
￿n￿ B ￿￿ BE4￿
| ￿
2 ￿￿ Bb￿ E4￿
| ￿
2
,
where ￿ B is estimated from the sample data.
10 According to the logic of our test, this coef¿cient
of correlation is adjusted so as to allow for the fact that changes in the volatility of stock prices
inHongKongwillSHU VHaffect cross-border comovementsduring theHong Kong crisis. Thus,
the observed 4￿
| is adjusted on the basis of the estimated increase in the variance of o￿, that
is ￿ B.G i v e n￿ B, a smaller b￿ (shifting weight towards an increase in the variance of the global
factor) entails a smaller adjusted coef¿cient.
A visual inspection of ¿gure 5 suggests that the unadjusted correlation coef¿cient 4￿
|
increased signi¿cantly during the Hong Kong crisis in October 1997 relative to the previous
43 The coef¿cient !
3 is obtained by substituting ! with ￿F in equation (2), and then solving the resulting
expression for ￿.19
months. Is this evidence of contagion? In light of our discussion in the previous section,
we can test contagion vs. interdependence by comparing ￿
￿
|Eb￿￿ and 4|.S p e c i ¿cally, the
null hypothesis of interdependence is accepted when ￿
￿
|Eb￿￿ is not signi¿cantly larger than
4|. Figure 5 plots different estimates of ￿
￿
|Eb￿￿ conditional on values of b￿ between f and D.
Thegraph showsthat theadjusted coef¿cient ￿
￿
|Eb￿￿is closeto4| forlowvalues ofthevariance
ratio, while it gets signi¿cantly larger for values of b￿ around D. The graph thus suggests that
the hypothesis of interdependence could be accepted conditional on some b￿ smaller than D.
Figure 5
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The literature provides a few examples of conditional correlation tests of contagion, but
in most cases the maintained assumption on the br is only implicit. In the following section,
we will review these tests, nesting them in our framework.20
4.1 7HVWV EDVHG RQ WKH VDPSOH FRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQW RU b ’￿ *42 ￿ ￿
Early contributions on contagion, such as King and Wadhwani (1990), acknowledge
the problem of controlling for the relationship between volatility of return and correlation,
but implement no correction of their empirical tests.
11 It is instructive to use our model to
highlight theconditionsunder which asimple test of correlationis consistent with our measure
of interdependence. Looking at equation (3), note that ￿ is exactly equal to 4 only when:
b
￿
￿ ’ b￿ ’￿ *4
2 ￿ ￿ . (4)
For this particular value of the variance ratio,
12 interdependence implies that the correlation
coef¿cient shouldnot respondtoa crisisin country￿. Thus, we can perform a test of contagion
just by verifying whether the simple correlation coef¿cient has changed signi¿cantly during a
crisis.
Interestingly, the implicit assumption in condition (4) is a negative relationship between
the correlation coef¿cient during tranquil period 4 and the variance ratio b￿: the higher the
correlation between o￿ and o￿, the higher the importance of the global factor and, in turn, the
lower b￿. This is not an unreasonable assumption in general. However, unless b￿ happens to
be exactly equal (or close) to the inverse of the squared correlation coef¿cient minus one, tests
of contagion based on comparing simple correlation will be biased. It could be interesting to
explore the loss of accuracy of the test in the region around that value of the variance ratio.
4.2 7HVWV EDVHG RQ DQ DGMXVWHG FRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQW ZLWK b ’f
Consider the approach championed by Forbes and Rigobon (1999a,b). The key to these
contributions is the (implicit) assumption that the rate of return of the stock market in country
￿ coincides with the global factor. In terms of our factor model, this is equivalent to assuming
that the data generating process of the rates of return is:
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s n 0￿ (5)
44 King and Wadhwani (1990) are aware of the relationship between volatility and correlation as they write:
“we might expect that the contagion coef¿cients would be an increasing function of volatility” ( p .2 0 ) .H o w e v e r ,
in calculating correlation between markets, they do not correct for the increase in volatility.
45 A similar but more cumbersome expression could be derived for the general case in which ￿
F
m 9@ ￿m.21
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ s ,
so that
o￿ ’
￿
k￿ ￿
k￿
￿￿
￿
n
￿￿
￿￿
￿ o￿ n 0￿ ,
corresponding to the linear equation at the root of Forbes’ and Rigobon’s estimates:
13
o￿ ’ qf n q￿ ￿ o￿ n 0￿ . (6)
Thus, there is no country-speci¿c shock affecting o￿. In terms of our framework, T@ oE0￿￿’f
implies b
￿
￿ ’ b￿ ’f .
A statistical framework closely related to Forbes’ and Rigobon’st e s ti sp r e s e n t e db y
Boyer et al. (1999) and Loretan and English (2000), who assume that Eo￿co ￿￿ is a normal
bivariate random variable. The equivalence between the two approaches can be easily
understood by referring to the following property: if Eo￿co ￿￿ is a normal bivariate random
variable, one can write
14
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ o￿ n v￿ (7)
o￿ ’ k￿ n ￿￿ ￿ v￿
where v￿ and v￿ are orthogonal and normally distributed random variables. It is apparent that,
as in Forbes and Rigobon, the country-speci¿c shock in ￿ is the global factor, up to an af¿ne
transformation.
The test statistic adopted by Boyer et al. (1999) and Loretan and English (2000), which
follows from the model (7), is the same as the one adopted by Forbes and Rigobon (1999a,b):
4
￿
￿nB
￿nB42
￿￿*2
. (8)
46 Forbes and Rigobon (1999a) ¿lter their data estimating a VAR model with domestic and international
interests rates and lagged returns. Then, after de¿ning ul and um as the residuals of their VAR estimates, they
analyze the correlation with the model (6). Note that in the theoretical part of the paper Forbes and Rigobon
(1999a) actually write a symmetric model, where ul and um are interdependent. However, the symmetric model is
not estimated.
47 These tests have been sometimes used by ¿nancial market paricipants. See Deutsche Bank (2000).22
This is the correlation between two jointly normal random variables as a function of the
increase in the variance of one of them, B — also knownin the literature as ‘normal correlation
theorem’. Note that (8) coincides with our measure of interdependence (3) when there is
no idiosyncratic shock in country ￿￿ that is, when b
￿
￿ ’ b￿ ’f . Thus, the measures of
interdependence (2) and (3) could be interpreted as a generalization of the normal correlation
theorem.
In these models, the test strategy consists in verifying whether the statistic (8) is
signi¿cantly different from 4￿. The drawback of tests using the statistic (8) is quite clear.
In equation (6), o￿ depends linearly on o￿, so that there is no component of the variance of
o￿ that is country-speci¿c. The stock market return in country ￿ is speci¿ed as a ‘global’ or
‘regional’ factor. The test statistic (8) is therefore only applicable when every single shock in
country ￿ has global or regional repercussions. Do we really believe that the rate of return in
Hong Kong or Thailand is (or coincides with) a global or even a regional factor both before
and after a crisis?
The speci¿cation of o￿ as a global factor has important implications for the test. To the
extent that the increase in the variance of the market in country ￿ is due to idiosyncratic shocks
in this country, the theoretical correlation coef¿cient (8) will be biased. Such bias will be
larger, the larger the share of variance in o￿ that can be attributed to country-speci¿c shocks.
As apparent from equation (6), specifying o￿ as a global factor magni¿es the theoretical
correlation ￿ between the two markets and increases the chances that its variance will explain
the observed correlation during the crisis. Hence, the test will be biased towards the null
hypothesis of interdependence. It may not come entirely as a surprise that WKLV NLQG RI WHVW
KDUGO\ ¿QG DQ\ HYLGHQFH RIFRQWDJLRQ￿
15 Inthenext section, wewill provideempirical evidence
showing thatmany strong resultsin theliteratureareseverelyaffected bythetest biasdiscussed
above.
￿￿ (PSLULFDO HYLGHQFH
We now present an application of our methodology to the international effects of the
October 1997 stock market crisis in Hong Kong.
16 Using data from 7KRPVRQ )LQDQFLDO
48 See for instance Boyer et al. (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (1999a,b).
49 For a comparison, see Forbes and Rigobon (1999a).23
’DWDVWUHDP, we analyze correlation between stock market returns of Hong Kong with ten
emerging economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Russia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and the G7 countries. In our benchmark estimation
we calculate two-day rolling averages of daily returns in US dollars and we de¿ne tranquil and
turbulent periods as starting from 1 January 1997 to 17 October 1997 and from 20 October
1997 to 30 November 1997 respectively.
17 This de¿nition of the crisis period follows the crash
recorded by the stock market index in Hong Kong, which lost 25 per cent of its value in just
four days starting on 20 October 1997. Hong Kong stock prices declined until the end of
November, apparently in￿uencing returns in several other markets.
Although our test procedure is symmetrical, we adopt the common practice of testing
for contagion as a phenomenon in which correlation is signi¿cantly higher during the crisis
period. Hence, our test hypotheses are:
Mf G 4
￿ ￿ ￿ LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH
M￿ G 4
￿ :￿ FRQWDJLRQ ￿
Looking at the de¿nition (2) of the coef¿cient of interdependence ￿, note that 4 and B,a sw e l l
as the coef¿cient 4￿, can easily be estimated from the data. The main challenge in carrying
out this test is to ¿nd good estimates of b￿ and b
￿
￿ .
Wewill proceed as follows. First, weset up a conditional test ¿xing the value of variance
ratios parametrically￿ namely, we calculate minimum thresholds for b￿ and b
￿
￿ at which the
difference between 4￿ and ￿ becomes statistically signi¿cant. Second, we compare these
threshold with empirical estimates of these variance ratios, obtained using different methods.
5.1 &RQGLWLRQDO WHVW￿ LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKUHVKROG YDOXHV IRU b DQG b
￿
In this section, we identify critical thresholds for b￿ and b
￿
￿ at which the null hypothesis
is rejected at a given con¿dence level. To clarify the meaning of these thresholds, consider
¿rst the case in which b
￿
￿ ’ b￿. By inspecting equation (3), we see that ￿ is monotonically
decreasing in b￿, for given 4 and B. Suppose we ¿nd 4￿ signi¿cantly larger than ￿ for a given
4: We use US dollar returns because they represent pro¿ts of investors with international portfolios. As
stock markets in different countries are not simultaneously open, two-day rolling averages of returns have been
preferred to simple returns.24
b￿ ’ b
￿￿ it follows that 4￿ is also signi¿cantly larger than ￿ for any b￿ ’ b
￿￿ :b
￿. Therefore,
we can look for WKH PLQLPXP YDOXH RI b￿ — denoted with 7 b — at which the hypothesis of
interdependence would be rejected at some prespeci¿ed con¿dence level. Analogously, in
the case b
￿
￿ 9’ b￿, equation (2) shows that ￿ is monotonically decreasing in b
￿
￿ . Hence, for
any given b￿ we can look for WKH PLQLPXP YDOXH RI b
￿
￿ — denoted with 7 b
￿ — at which the
hypothesis of interdependence would be rejected. In the ¿rst case, the result of the conditional
test will be a WKUHVKROG 7 b￿ in the second case, the result will be a WKUHVKROG IXQFWLRQ that gives
the threshold 7 b
￿ for any positive b￿.
Tests of equality between two correlation coef¿cients can be performed using the )LVKHU
]￿WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ:
5Ee 4￿’
￿
2
*?
￿ne 4
￿ ￿e 4
,
where e 4 is the estimated correlation coef¿cient. Under the assumption that two samples
are drawn from two independent bivariate normal distributions with the same correlation
coef¿cient, Stuart and Ord (1991, 1994) show that the difference between estimated 5 Ee 4￿
in the two samples converges to a normal distribution with mean and variance speci¿ed below:
￿
￿
fc
￿
?￿ ￿ ￿
n
￿
?2 ￿ ￿
￿
,
where ?￿ and ?2 denote the size of the two samples.
We proceed as follows. We estimate the correlation coef¿cients during the tranquil
period, e 4, and during the crisis period, e 4
￿, as well as the increase in the variance in the
Hong Kong stock market, e B. By substituting e 4 and e B into (2), we obtain an estimation of
our measure of interdependence as a function of b￿ and b
￿
￿ , that is e ￿Eb￿cb
￿
￿ ￿.G i v e n5Ee 4
￿￿ and
5Ee ￿Eb￿cb
￿
￿ ￿￿, we derive threshold values of b￿ and b
￿
￿ from:
5Ee 4
￿￿ ￿ 5Ee ￿E7 bc7 b
￿￿ ￿’￿ ￿SeDj5 , (9)
where j5 ’
￿
?3￿ n
￿
?￿3￿, with ? and ?￿ denoting the sample size of the tranquil and the crisis
periods.
A problem in the above procedure is that the assumption of independent samples is
violated, since e B depends on both the tranquil and crisis period samples: the signi¿cance level
of the test (9) is not the standard 5 per cent. To assess the signi¿cance level of our test, we25
have resorted to Montecarlo simulation experiments. We have run ￿cfffcfff replications for
different country pairs, varying the parameter values and sample size. In all our simulations,
the signi¿cance level of the statistic (9) is comprised between 7 and 9 per cent. For instance,
setting ? ’2 f H , ?￿ ’￿ fand B ’H ￿.2, as in our benchmark estimation, and 4 ’f ￿2￿b,
4￿ ’f cSS￿, which are the observed correlation coef¿cients between the markets of Hong
Kong and the Philippines, the signi¿cance level of the test corresponding to (9) is 8.1 per cent.
5.1.1 7KH FDVH RI D FRQVWDQW YDULDQFH UDWLR
Consider ¿rst the case b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ . The threshold level of the variance ratio, 7 b, can easily
be found by inverting equation (9). This yields:
_
b’
+￿
e 4
e / n￿
e / ￿ ￿
￿2 ￿
￿n￿ B
￿
￿ ￿
,
￿
￿ Be 4
2 ￿ ￿ , (10)
where e / ’i  T
￿
2
￿
5Ee 4
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿SeDj5
￿￿
, and (as de¿ned above) e 4 and e 4
￿ are the sample
correlation coef¿cients. Consistently withthe logic of our test, if one believes that thevariance
ratio in Hong Kong during 1997 were constant and lower than the value
_
b solving the above
equation, one should also accept the null hypothesis of interdependence.
The ¿rst two columns of table 1 report the correlation between two-day rolling averages
of stock market returns in US dollars of Hong Kong with each country in the sampleduring the
tranquil, e 4, and the crisis period, e 4
￿. The third column of table 1 reports the threshold level of
the variance ratio, 7 b, corresponding to (10). It is apparent that
_
b tends to be larger, the smaller
the difference between e 4
￿ and e 4￿ in other words, if the correlation between two stock markets
does not increase sharply during the crisis period, the null of interdependence can be rejected
only for very high values of the variance ratio. Note also that, when correlation decreases
between the tranquil and the crisis period, the null of interdependence cannot be rejected at all
E7 b ’n 4￿. When the correlation in the tranquil period is about zero, as in the case of Italy,
the null of interdependence is rejected for any value of b￿.
Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis of interdependence will be rejected for ‘low’
values of b￿ in the case of Italy, France, Singapore, the UK and the Philippines. For instance,
if one believes that b￿ ’￿(a value that we will ¿nd in one of our estimates), our test would26
reject interdependence for all the countries listed above. At b￿ ’.(that will be our highest
estimated value), the test would also reject for Germany.
We stress the consequence of setting b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ ’f , as implicitly done in some of
the literature reviewed in the previous section. Under this assumption, the test would reject
interdependence only in the case of Italy – that is, there would be almost no evidence of
contagion. Yet, there are at least four countries for which the strong result of ‘no contagion’ is
quite dubious.
Table 1 also reports the results of the Fisher test, based on unadjusted correlation
coef¿cients, so that the null hypothesis is Mf G 4￿ ￿ 4. We have shown that this test
corresponds to our conditional correlation analysis if b￿ happens to be exactly equal to
￿*42￿￿.
18 Interpreting the table, observe that this test rejects the null whenever ￿*42￿￿ : 7 b.
ThisisthecaseforIndonesia, thePhilippines, Singapore, Russiaand, amongtheG7, Germany,
France, the UK and Italy. Compared with the results from a test conditional on a positive but
low b (say b ’e ), there is some weak evidence of contagion for two countries that do not
appear in our list of ‘suspects’ above, Indonesia and Russia. So, there is a substantial, although
not perfect, overlap of results.
Nonetheless, note that the required variance ratio for the Fisher test on unadjusted
correlation coef¿cientsto be consistent with our framework (that is, the magnitude of￿*42￿￿)
is extremely — and unrealistically — high for most countries. Only in two cases, Singapore
and Indonesia, ￿*42 ￿ ￿ is smaller then 10.
5.1.2 7KH FDVH RI YDULDEOH YDULDQFH UDWLRV
Allowing the variance ratio to vary between the tranquil and the crisis period, i.e.
b
￿
￿ 9’ b￿, equation (9) can be rewritten as:
%
￿ne 4
2e BE￿ n b￿￿nE b￿ ￿ 7 b
￿￿
E￿ n 7 b
￿￿
E￿ n b￿￿
&#
￿n7 b
￿
￿nb￿
$2
￿
￿
e 4
e / n￿
e / ￿ ￿
￿2 ￿
￿ne B
￿
’f,
4; Recall that there is only one value of the variance ratio that is true for Hong Kong. Then, the Fisher test
will be correct for at most one of the country pairs (or for a set of countries whose stock markets happen to be
equally correlated with Hong Kong’s).27
which implicitly de¿nes 7 b
￿ as a function of b￿. Figure 6 graphs this implicit function for the
case of Hong Kong and the Philippines. For any pair Eb￿cb
￿
￿ ￿ above the function, the test will
reject the hypothesis of interdependence. For any pair Eb￿cb
￿
￿ ￿ below the function, the test
will accept the null. The pair at the crossing between the function and the eD￿ degree line from
the origin identi¿es the threshold 7 b reported in table 1.
Figure 6
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5.2 6RPH HYLGHQFH RQ WKH YDULDQFH UDWLR
What do we know about b￿ and b
￿
￿ ? Based on the single factor model in (1), a ¿rst,
simple approach to obtain estimates of these variance ratios consists in specifying a composite
‘global factor’, suchasthedailyaveragereturninacrosssectionof stockmarkets. Weestimate
such a global factor in different ways: we ¿rst use the sample of the G7 countries, then our
full sample excluding Hong Kong￿¿ nally we adopt the ‘world stock market index’ produced
by 7KRPVRQ )LQDQFLDO ’DWDVWUHDP. After computing the two-day rolling average of returns on
the global factor, we regress the two-day rolling average of Hong Kong’s returns on it. The28
variance of the residuals from this regression gives an estimate of the variance of the country
speci¿c shock, from which we obtain an estimate of b￿.
The results from this procedure are shown in the ¿rst half of table 2. In our sample,
the order of magnitude of the variance ratio for Hong Kong is between 2 and e:i . e . ,i nt h e
Hong Kong stock market, the variance of country-speci¿c shocks is between 2 and e times the
variance of the global factor (multiplied by the factor loading ￿￿). Most interestingly, these
ratios do not vary substantially between the tranquil and the crisis period.
A second approach for estimating the variance ratio is based on principal component
analysis.
19 First, we calculate the principal components for our full sample of rolling averages
of returns. We then regress the rolling average of returns in country ￿ on the principal
components, using the residual from this regression to estimate the variance of the country
speci¿c shocks. Results are shown in the second half of table 2.
Our estimates of b￿ for the full sample are not too distant from what we obtained by
using the composite global factor. The ¿rst principal component gives an estimated variance
ratio equal to .￿￿. If we include the ¿rst ¿ve components in the regression (so as to explain
76 per cent of the variance in the sample), e b￿ is equal to e￿￿. At the margin, the difference in
the estimated value of b￿ is only relevant in the case of Germany (for this country, 7 b ’e ￿e).
Note however that our test statistic is derived under the assumption of a single factor model,
and thus it is not directly applicable in a multi-factor world.
A key conclusion from these preliminary (and admittedly rough) estimates based on a
single factor model of returns is that WKH YDULDQFH UDWLR LV ZHOO EHORZ ZKDW LV QHHGHG WR MXVWLI\
D WHVW EDVHG RQ XQDGMXVWHG FRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV (see Table 1). At the same time, however,
WKH YDOXH RI WKH br LV ERXQGHG DZD\ IURP ]HUR. Appendix II shows that these two results are
robust even when we use returns in US dollars instead of returns in local currency, change
the de¿nitions of tranquil and crisis periods, replace rolling averages of returns with simple
daily returns, and estimate a VAR model of returns using domestic and US interest rates as
exogenous variables. The results of interdependence reached by Boyer et al. (1999) and
Forbes and Rigobon (1999a) do not survive when the implicit bias in their test is removed.
4< This approachis consistent with moregeneral dynamic factor models, as shownin Forni and Lippi (1997).29
￿￿ &RQFOXVLRQ
This paper has presented a general framework to approach tests of contagion between
stock markets in different countries based on correlation analysis. A number of tests in the
literature correct for potential bias due to changes in the variance of global shocks driving
returns. By analyzing these tests as special cases of our framework, we show that these tests
are conditional on arbitrary assumptions about the variance of country-speci¿cs h o c k si nt h e
market where the crisis originates. When this variance is set equal to zero after the eruption of
the ¿nancial turmoil — as done in a number of contributions — the chances of accepting the
null of interdependence are very high.
Our preliminary empirical estimates suggests that, for the case of the Hong Kong stock
market crisis in October 1997, the variance of the country-speci¿c component of returns is not
zero. Results from a single factor model show that it is 2 to 7 times higher than the component
that can be attributed to the variance of the global factor. For most country pairs in our sample,
interdependence can be rejected only for larger values of this ratio. Based on our estimates,
we ¿nd evidence of contagion from the Hong Kong crisis in the case of Singapore and the
Philippines, among the emerging markets, and France, Italy, the UK and (weakly) Germany,
among the advanced countries. By contrast, the bias in conditional tests arbitrarily setting
b ’fis quite severe. For all the countries in our sample but one (Italy), these tests would
accept the null of interdependence.
The empirical analysis of this paper has been kept simple (we used a single factor model
of returns), and as close as possible to correlation analysis. It should be clear, however, that
the issue of controlling for country-speci¿c shocks in contagion analysis is limited neither to
correlation analysis, nor to a single-factor model of returns, but should be addressed in all tests
identifying contagion as a structural break in the transmission mechanism.$SSHQGL[ ,
This appendix derives the expression (2) of the coef¿cient of interdependence ￿ in
the general case. From the data generating process of o￿, the unconditional variance of the
idiosyncratic shock 0￿ can be written as:
T@ oE0￿￿’T@ o Eo￿￿ ￿￿
2
￿ ￿ T@ o Es￿ .
By the de¿nition of b￿ and the data generating process of o￿, we can also get:
T@ o Es￿’
T@ o Eo￿￿
￿2
￿E￿ n b￿￿
.
Therefore, we ¿nd:
T@ oE0￿￿
￿2
￿ ￿ T@ o Es￿
’
T@ o Eo￿￿
￿2
￿ ￿ T@ o Es￿
￿￿’
￿2
￿E￿ n b￿￿T@ o Eo￿￿
￿2
￿T@ oEo￿￿
￿ ￿ . (11)
For convenience, we rewrite the expression of the correlation coef¿cient induced by the
process (1):
4 ’
￿
k
￿n
T@ o E0￿￿
￿2
￿T@ o Es￿
l￿*2
￿ d￿ n b￿o
￿*2
. (12)
Substituting (11) into (12), we obtain the unconditional correlation coef¿cient as a function of
the rates of return, the factor loadings and b￿:
4 ’
￿￿
￿￿
%
￿
￿nb￿
￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
￿3￿*2&
. (13)
We now turn to the crisis period. From the data generating process of the rate of return
of the stock market in country ￿, the variance of o￿ during the crisis is:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿’￿
2
￿ ￿ T@ oEs m ￿￿nT@ o E0￿￿. (14)
Note that by the data generating process (1) and by the de¿nition of b￿ and b
￿
￿ , it follows that:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
’￿nB ’
￿nb
￿
￿
￿nb￿
T@ o Es m ￿￿
T@ o Es￿
. (15)31
By solving (15) for T@ o Es m ￿￿ and substituting the resulting expression into (14) we get:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿’T@ o Eo￿￿n￿￿
2
￿T@ o Es￿,
where ￿ is de¿n e da si nf o l l o w s
￿ ’
BE￿ n b￿￿nE b￿ ￿ b
￿
￿ ￿
￿nb
￿
￿
.
Hence, we obtain:
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
’
T@ o Eo￿￿n￿￿2
￿T@ o Es￿
E￿ n B￿T@ o Eo￿￿
’
’
T@ o Eo￿￿
E￿ n B￿T@ o Eo￿￿
n
￿￿2
￿
E￿ n B￿E￿ n b￿￿￿2
￿
. (16)
From (13), the correlation coef¿cient during the crisis period in the hypothesis that only the
variances of s and 0￿ change, while the factor loadings remain constant — which is our
coef¿cient of interdependence ￿ — can be written as:
￿Eb￿cb
￿
￿ cBc4￿’
￿￿
￿￿
%
￿
￿nb
￿
￿
￿
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
T@ o Eo￿ m ￿￿
￿3￿*2&
. (17)
Substituting (A.6) into (17), we ¿nally obtain:
￿Eb￿cb
￿
￿ cBc4￿’
%
E￿ n b
￿
￿ ￿2
E￿ n B￿
￿2
￿
￿2
￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
T@ o Eo￿￿
n
￿E￿ n b
￿
￿ ￿2
E￿ n B￿E￿ n b￿￿
&3￿*2
’
’
%
E￿ n b
￿
￿ ￿2
E￿ n B￿E￿ n b￿￿242 n
￿E￿ n b￿￿E￿ n b
￿
￿ ￿242
E￿ n B￿E￿ n b￿￿242
&3￿*2
’
’ 4
+
E￿ n b
￿
￿ ￿2 ￿ d￿ n ￿E￿ n b￿￿42o
E￿ n B￿E￿ n b￿￿2
,3￿*2
,
which can be rearranged to give equation (2).$SSHQGL[ ,,
Our test results are not sensitive to a number of changes in our sample. In order to show
this, we have run our tests using returns in local currency (instead of the US dollar), modifying
the de¿nitions of tranquil and crisis periods, replacing rolling averages of returns with simple
daily returns, and ¿ltering the data with US interest rates. Table 3 summarizes the results,
showing the number of countries for which interdependence is rejected under each run of the
analysis. For each de¿nition of our sample, we carry out Fisher’s test, as well as our test
procedure with b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ (where the constant variance ratio is estimated using the ‘world stock
market index’)a n dw i t hb￿ ’ b
￿
￿ ’f .
Our conclusions are quite robust to a change in the currency of denomination of stock
prices. This is true not only for countries that maintained a ¿xed or quasi-¿xed exchange rate
with respect to the dollar, but also for countries that experienced a sharp devaluation of their
currency in our sample period. In the case of Thailand vs. Hong Kong, for instance, e 4 and e 4
￿
are equal to f￿￿fe and f￿f￿￿, respectively, when using returns in local currency, while they are
f￿￿fS and f￿ffD when using returns in dollars. When we run our test setting b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ ’f ,i n
our benchmark samplewe reject interdependenceonly for Italy￿ using returns in local currency
we also reject interdependence for the UK. When we set b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ , our test rejects the null for
Italy, the UK, Singapore, France and the Philippines, regardless of the currency in which we
calculate returns.
By the same token, our results are robust to changes in the timing of the tranquil and the
crisis periods. When we alter the de¿nition of WUDQTXLO SHULRG to include 1996, our test rejects
the null for Italy, Singapore, France and the Philippines, but not for the UK. As correlation
remained quite high on average at the end of 1997 (see Figures 3a-3d), we have also estimated
a model including December 1997 in the FULVLV SHULRG. In this case, results are unaffected
relative to our benchmark estimation.
Interestingly, if we replace two-day rolling averages with simple GDLO\ UHWXUQV,t h e
number of cases in which the conditional tests reject interdependence increases visibly, both
for b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ ’fand for b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ .
20 In particular, conditional on b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ ’f , we reject
53 Here we have excluded test results of the United States and Thailand, for which the estimated correlation
coef¿cients during the tranquil and crisis period fall to zero. In this case, tests based on Fisher z-transformation33
interdependence for Italy, France, the UK￿ using the estimated variance ratio together with the
hypothesis b￿ ’ b
￿
￿ , we also reject for Singapore, the Philippines, Germany and Russia.
Finally, we have run the same testing procedure as in Forbes and Rigobon (1999a),
consisting in a VAR model of returns using domestic and US interest rates as exogenous
variables. We havealso expanded on theirtest by including oil pricesas an exogenousvariable.
The results from these procedures con¿rm our conclusions.
are not appropriate (see Stuart and Ord, 1994).7DEOHV DQG ¿JXUHV
Table 1
+21* .21* &5,6,6 – &21’,7,21$/ $1’ ),6+(5 7(676
Country e 4 e 4
￿
_
b Fisher ￿
42 ￿ ￿
Indonesia 0.31 0.60 7.1 *9 . 7
Korea 0.16 0.07 n4 - 38.7
Malaysia 0.20 0.43 64.5 - 24.8
Philippines 0.22 0.66 2.6 ** 19.8
Singapore 0.36 0.76 1.5 ** 6.5
Thailand 0.11 0.01 n4 - 88.6
Argentina 0.26 0.21 n4 - 13.5
Brazil 0.20 0.31 30,941.3 - 23.1
Mexico 0.29 0.45 49.3 - 10.8
Russia 0.19 0.53 13.8 * 26.9
USA 0.15 0.26 254.0 - 42.1
Japan 0.28 0.33 7486.5 - 11.4
Germany 0.24 0.63 4.4 ** 16.8
France 0.17 0.66 1.2 ** 32.3
United Kingdom 0.17 0.63 2.3 ** 33.0
Italy 0.00 0.63 0.00 ** 732,762
Canada 0.27 0.37 389.8 - 12.8
Note: e 4 and e 4
￿ are estimated correlation coef¿cients of two-day rolling averages of returns
in the tranquil and crisis periods￿
_
b is the threshold variance ratio as de¿ned in the
text (for e B ’H ￿.2). The fourth column reports the results of the Fisher test: * (**)
indicates that the hypothesis e 4
￿ ￿ e 4 is rejected at the D (￿) per cent signi¿cance level.
Table 2
(67,0$7,216 2) 7+( 9$5,$1&( 5$7,2 )25 +21* .21*
b ’ b
￿ bb
￿
Cross section:
G 7 2.8 2.9 3.2
Full sample 2.4 2.6 2.6
World stock market index 3.6 3.0 4.5
Principal components:
First component 7.1
First two components 7.0
First ¿ve components 4.1Table 3
52%8671(66 – 7(67 5(68/76
Number of countries for which
interdependence is rejected
Test: Fisher test b ’ b
￿ ’ e bb ’ b
￿ ’f
Sample:
Benchmark 851
Local currency 752
Tranquil: 3.1.96-17.10.97
Crisis: 20.10.97-28.11.97 841
Tranquil: 3.1.96-17.10.97
Crisis: 20.10.97-31.12.97 851
Daily returns 873
Note: The test b ’ b
￿ ’ e b is based on a global factor estimated as the return on the ‘world
stock market index’.Fig. 1a - Stock market volatility  (daily returns, 3M exp. mov. average)
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(Asia; 3 month exponential moving average)
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